S. Marien, The effect of electoral outcomes on political trust A multi–level analysis of 23 countries, Electoral Studies 2011, Vol 30, Iss 4.pdf

Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 712

–

726

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Electoral Studies

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud

The effect of electoral outcomes on political trust: A multi

–

level analysis

of 23 countries

e Marien

Centre for Political Research, University of Leuven, Parkstraat 45, Box 3602, 3000 Leuven, Belgium

article info

abstract

Article history:

Received 28 June 2010

Received in revised form 5 April 2011

Accepted 27 June 2011

Competing theoretical claims exist in the literature on the effect of proportionality on

political trust. To date, empirical studies yielded mixed results. In this paper, we examine

a curvilinear effect of the proportionality of election outcomes on political trust using data

from the European Social Survey (2006

ndings show that political trust is

indeed highest in countries with very proportional as well as in countries with very

disproportional election outcomes and lowest in countries that fall in between. Election

outcomes that are more fully inclusive and those that provide more accountability can

both lead to higher levels of political trust. Next to the proportionality of the translation of

votes into seats, this study investigates a broad range of election outcomes that are

associated with (dis)proportionality i.e. the effect of the number of parties in elections,

parliament and government, voting for the winning or losing party under different levels

of proportionality and the clarity of responsibility.

–

2009). The

Keywords:

Political trust

Election outcomes

Comparative

European Social Survey

1. Introduction

politicians and hold them accountable ( Sartori, 1994 ).

Political trust is believed to be affected by electoral

outcomes such as the proportionality of the election

outcome, the number of political parties participating in

elections, in parliament and in of

In the last decades, there has been a renewal of interest

in the effect of electoral outcomes on political trust.

Widespread dissatisfaction with politics has been inter-

preted as the result of dissatisfaction with the functioning

of the electoral system. Electoral reform is often seen as

a way to restore political trust with recent examples of

electoral reforms that aimed to do this in New Zealand,

Italy and Japan ( Dalton, 2004 :177

ce. Also whether the

political party one voted for gains of

ce is argued to

uence political trust, especially when the election

outcome is disproportional the

gains substantial

representation and power in relation to the

‘

winner

’

.In

addition, clarity of responsibility is also theorized to raise

political trust levels. While scholars agree upon the

importance of these election outcomes on political trust,

the direction of the effects is still debated. For one,

proportional as well as disproportional election outcomes,

single-party governments as well as coalitions are believed

to increase political trust levels. Moreover, despite the

substantial literature on the effects of electoral outcomes

on the attitudes of citizens toward the political system,

empirical studies testing these propositions have been in

much shorter supply and evidence emerging from the

existing studies is far from conclusive. For example,

‘

loser

’

187; Shugart and

Wattenberg, 2001 ). Also the emergence of new democra-

cies and cases of divided societies has stimulated research

interest in the effect of electoral design and its outcomes on

political trust ( Lijphart, 1999; Farrell and McAllister, 2006 ).

The electoral system links citizens and elites and political

trust is considered to be an indication of the quality of this

linkage ( Aarts and Thomassen, 2008 ). In effect, through

elections citizens can communicate their preferences to

–

E-mail address: So

e.marien@soc.kuleuven.be .

0261-3794/$

–

see front matter

doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2011.06.015

S. Marien / Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 712

726

713

–

proportional as well as disproportional election outcomes

are found to foster political trust or no relation is found at

all ( Lijphart, 1999; Norris, 2011 :217

direct result of satisfaction with particular outputs of the

system. However, con

icting demands exist and not all

–

235; Wagner et al.,

demands can be satis

outputs cannot help

but provide a weak reed upon which a system might rest

its full weight

ed thereby

“

2009 ). Farrell and McAllister

(2006 : 724) conclude:

“

”

Whether and how electoral systems can affect levels of

satisfaction with democracy is therefore unresolved; work

is required.

( Easton, 1965 : 277). Therefore, Easton

(1965 : 273) highlights the importance of a second type

of support

”

In this article two theoretical approaches are

combined, proposing a curvilinear effect of proportion-

ality on political trust: political trust is highest in coun-

tries with very proportional and very disproportional

election outcomes and it is lowest in countries that fall in

between. This theoretical expectation provides a pro-

mising way to investigate the effect of proportionality on

political trust given the competing theoretical claims and

the mixed empirical evidence in the literature. Next to the

proportionality of the election outcome, the effect on

political trust of a large number of election outcomes is

investigated. This study adds to the literature by

proposing this curvilinear effect of proportionality on

political trust as well as by providing an overview of the

relation between a broad range of election outcomes and

political trust. First, the importance of political trust is

discussed. Subsequently, we provide an overview of the

theoretical arguments and previous empirical research on

the relationship between electoral outcomes and political

trust. Next, we turn to comparative survey data to analyze

the

a reservoir

of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to

accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or

the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants.

–

diffuse support

–

which serves as

“

”

Political trust is de

ned as an expression of diffuse rather

than speci

cally to the

regime and the political authorities ( Easton, 1975 ). In-line

with David Easton, political trust is considered in this

study as an expression of diffuse support which is not the

mere result of satisfaction of individual demands. The

focus of this study is trust in the regime and trust in

political institutions in particular. Political institutions play

an important role in shaping a democratic society, we can

assume that trust in these institutions is strongly related

to a more general evaluation of the political system.

Theoretically, we can assume that a critical attitude

toward the current leaders can be seen as healthy for

democracy. Nevertheless, citizens should be able to put

trust in the democratic procedures and institutions as

such, i.e. the system level. Politicians can be easily

replaced through elections but strong distrust in the

fundamental institutions of a democracy is less easily

restored ( Dalton, 2004 :157

c support and it is attributed speci

relationship

between

election

outcomes

and

political trust. The main

ndings are summarized in the

–

159; Klingemann and Fuchs,

conclusion.

1995 :2

–

5; Anderson et al., 2005 ).

2. The importance of political trust

3. Election outcomes and political trust

Political trust is at the center of democratic theory.

“

Scholars have argued that political trust is promoted

through the inherent fairness and inclusiveness of

proportional election outcomes ( Lijphart, 1999 ).

Conversely, political trust is also believed to be fostered by

disproportional outcomes as these promote accountability

and effectiveness ( Aarts and Thomassen, 2008 ). These

different characteristics result from the distinct goals that

underlie different electoral systems:

ects evaluations of whether or not political authorities

and institutions are performing in accordance with the

normative expectations held by the public

( Miller and

Listhaug, 1990 : 358). Political trust operates as

a heuristic devise that guides all kinds of behavior such as

participation in politics, law abidance or the willingness to

contribute to the collective good ( Hetherington, 1999;

Scholz and Lubell, 1998 ). Citizens with higher political

trust levels are more likely than distrusting citizens to

accept and comply with political decisions voluntarily,

thereby political trust enables political authorities to

collect resources and implement political decisions more

effectively ( Tyler, 1990; Marien and Hooghe, 2011 ). As

a result, political trust is a key resource for a political

system to authoritatively allocate values for society

( Easton, 1965 ). However, some authors have argued that

critical citizens can force political systems and political

decision makers to react in a more responsive manner to

demands from the population ( Norris, 1999; Rosanvallon,

2008; Gei

”

the major difference

between the majoritarian and proportional vision is their

view on the essence of democratic government and

consequently the function of elections

“

”

( Aarts and

Thomassen, 2008 : 6). Proportional election outcomes

are generally seen as more fair than the disproportional

‘

outcome ( Sartori, 1994 ). Seats

were allocated to parties in proportion to the votes they

received at election, as a result voters determine to a great

extent which parties obtain seats and only few votes are

wasted ( Karp and Banducci, 2008 ). A proportional elec-

tion outcome is generally characterized by inclusiveness.

In effect, proportional electoral rules aim to lower the

threshold for parliamentary representation encouraging

more parties to enter the electoral contest resulting in the

presentation of various alternatives to the electorate, from

extreme-right parties to extreme-left parties to pirate-

parties or animal parties etc. As party choice can effec-

tively be used to voice (speci

the winner takes it all

’

el, 2008 ). By critically examining govern-

ment

’

s policy and governance, citizens keep government

cials accountable on a permanent basis. Nevertheless,

most authors agree that some level of political trust is

needed for the stability and functioning of democratic

societies.

David Easton has made an important distinction

between diffuse and speci

c) political preferences,

citizens

uence is strengthened. New issues

cherished by the public can more easily be put on the

’

feeling of in

c support. The latter is the

714

S. Marien / Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 712

726

–

agenda by new minor parties and discontent can be

voiced by voting on minor protest parties which can

channel this discontent into the parliamentary arena

( Miller and Listhaug, 1990 ). A proportional election

outcome signi

proportional outcomes are associated with inclusiveness

and representativeness, disproportional outcomes are

associated with government accountability and effective-

ness. Proportional outcomes mean a proportional trans-

lation of votes into seats and are generally associated with

a large number of political parties in elections, parliament

and government. Disproportional outcomes, on the other

hand, mean a disproportional translation of votes into

seats and are in general associated with fewer political

parties in elections, parliament and generally single-party

governments.

es more inclusive representation of the

whole electorate and its opinions given that more political

parties are also passing the threshold to parliamentary

representation. As a result, also political minorities are

represented in parliament and can in

uence political

decision-making ( Lijphart, 1994; Karp and Banducci,

2008 ). Finally, this inclusiveness also relates to the

number of parties in of

ce. Coalitions have the advantage

that a broad range of interests nd their way to policy and

this policy is found to be closer to the median voter than

the policy of single-party governments ( McDonald and

Budge, 2005 ).

By contrast, disproportional rules are intended to

fabricate clear majorities often associated with two-party

systems ( Sartori, 1994 ). In effect, disproportional rules

4. Previous empirical research

Following electoral reform toward more proportionality

in New Zealand citizens felt signi

cantly more political

cacious and government was perceived as more

responsive ( Banducci et al., 1999 ). However, it is possible

that these changes are the result of enthusiasm for the

reform and not the increased proportionality as such. Given

that only few countries changed their electoral system so

profoundly in recent years ( Farrell, 2001 ), most research on

the relationship between the proportionality of electoral

outcomes and political trust is based on cross-national

comparisons. These studies yield contradicting results

showing higher levels of political trust in proportional

systems ( Lijphart, 1999 :275

“

not seek a parliament that re

ects the voting distribution;

they seek a clear winner. Their intent is not only to elect

a parliament but at the same time elect (if only by impli-

cation) a government

( Sartori, 1994 : 5). In general two

(blocks of) parties are competing in elections, the winner of

the election takes over the government and can implement

a clear policy (change). The party in government does not

have to compromise so much as a coalition government

does. When a single party is in of

”

–

287) and in disproportional

ce, the policy responsi-

bility is clear whereas responsibility is more diffuse in

coalition governments:

systems ( Norris, 1999 :217

nding no relationship

at all ( Listhaug et al., 2009; Norris, 2011; Wagner et al.,

2009 ). Further, empirical studies found higher trust levels

in countries with more parties contesting elections ( Weil,

1989 : 699). Miller and Listhaug (1990) concluded that the

varying thresholds for parliamentary representation were

crucial in determining the target, level and trends in

political distrust. In Norway which had a rather low

threshold for parliamentary representation, new parties

won seats in elections and disaffected voters were repre-

sented, whereas in US and Sweden discontent was accu-

mulated and resulted in higher levels of distrust:

–

235) or

usually there is an overlap

between the new and the old coalition, blurring the clarity

of responsibility and making the sanction of elections as an

instrument of accountability into a rather blunt weapon

“

”

( Aarts and Thomassen, 2008 : 7; See also Powell, 1989 ). The

rotation of parties in power is emphasized rather than

inclusiveness. In effect, inclusiveness can signify that

a party losing the election returns to power making it

dif

235;

Powell, 1989 ). As a result voters might incline to think that

it does not matter who is in power leading to resignation

and alienation. Next to this clarity of responsibility, single-

party governments are seen as more effective governments.

In the debate on electoral reform in New Zealand one of the

main concerns when implementing more proportional

electoral rules (and accordingly more proportional

outcomes) was a decrease in accountability and the effec-

tiveness of government ( Vowles et al., 2006 :268

cult to

‘

vote the rascals out

’

( Norris, 2011 :217

–

the

institution of elections has failed, during the past twenty

years, to act as a mechanism for reducing the accumulating

dissatisfaction in either Sweden or the United States

“

”

( Miller and Listhaug, 1990 : 383). However, some evidence

suggests that party fragmentation lowers political trust

( Norris, 2011 :217

235; Weil, 1989 ). But in other studies

fractionalization indices failed to reach statistical signi

–

270).

Coalitions, especially with many parties, are argued to be

more unstable and more often lead to policy impasse ( Weil,

1989 ).

Finally, citizens voting for the party that won the

election gain more in an electoral system producing

disproportional outcomes, therefore, they are thought to

have higher levels of political trust than winners in

a system that produces more proportional outcomes.

Voters of parties that have lost the election, on the other

hand, are theorized to be better off with proportional

election outcomes than disproportional ones ( Anderson

et al., 2005 ).

In sum, both proportional and disproportional election

outcomes are theorized to foster political trust. While

–

cance ( Wagner et al., 2009; Van der Meer, 2010 ).

Further, political trust was found to be higher in coun-

tries with coalition governments, but too much coalition

partners diminished political trust levels again ( Anderson

et al., 2005 ). It is argued that in such countries elites

rather than election outcomes determine the composition

of government. Cabinet instability is also found to be

related to lower levels of political trust ( Weil, 1989 ). In

addition, extensive research effort has been devoted to the

effects of winning and losing elections on political trust in

different institutional contexts. Anderson and Guillory

(1997) demonstrated that losers were more trusting in

consensual systems than in majoritarian systems and

winners were more trusting in majoritarian than consen-

sual systems. Hence, the gap in political trust is larger in

S. Marien / Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 712

726

715

–

majoritarian systems than in consensual systems. This

rmed in subsequent research (e.g. Criado

and Herreros, 2007 ). However, these studies make

a distinction between two institutional systems based on

elements such as the state structure, the number of legis-

lative chambers, judicial reviews, parliamentary or presi-

dential system etc. From these studies, it is unclear which

features of these systems are decisive. Later research

concluded that proportional systems affected political trust

levels of winners and losers ( Anderson et al., 2005 ).

However, this conclusion needs to be quali

nding was con

Fig. 1. Visualizing hypothesis 1.

ed, while their

analyses yielded a positive effect of proportional electoral

systems on political trust, the differential effect of these

systems on winners and losers was less convincing. 1 Finally

in the outline of the theoretical arguments, clarity of

responsibility was also stated to have a positive effect on

political trust levels. In empirical research, particular

attention has been paid to the relationship between

economic evaluations and political trust in different insti-

tutional settings ( Powell and Whitten, 1993; Criado and

Herreros, 2007 ). The study of Anderson (2000) esta-

blished for example that the relationship between the

evaluation of economic performance and political trust is

stronger when mechanisms of accountability are simple i.e.

when the institutional context clari

a curvilinear relationship between the proportionality of

election outcomes and political trust. Inclusiveness and

accountability both foster political trust, therefore, political

trust is highest in countries with very proportional as well

as very disproportional election outcomes and it is lowest

in countries that fall in between. This theoretical expecta-

tion can be summarized in the following hypothesis which

is also visualized in Fig. 1 :

H1 . A curvilinear relationship exists between the degree

of proportionality of election outcomes and political trust.

Political trust is highest if either election outcomes are

very proportional or very disproportional. Conversely,

a mixture of both results in lower levels of political trust.

In addition, the effect of a broad range of election

outcomes on political trust will be investigated. Firstly, the

number of choices that are presented to the electorate. The

hypothesis is that the more political parties participate in

elections, the higher the level of political trust in

a country. Also the inclusiveness of the legislature was

argued to increase political trust. Further, we hypothesize

that more political parties in of

es who is in charge of

policymaking (based on Powell and Whitten

s index of

clarity of responsibility), when the target of credit and

blame is large (coalitions), and when citizens have fewer

viable alternative choices (operationalized as parties in

parliament).

In sum, theoretical approaches underlie the argument

that both proportional and disproportional outcomes foster

political trust. Empirical research yielded evidence sup-

porting both claims or

’

nding no relation between pro-

portionality and political trust ( Lijphart, 1999; Norris, 2011 :

217

ce results in lower levels

of political trust. Another mechanism includes the diffe-

rence in winning and losing elections under different

electoral outcomes. In this study, we will test whether

election losers have higher levels of political trust in

countries with more proportional election outcomes than

in countries with less proportional election outcomes. A

last mechanism relates to the differences in clarity of

responsibility under different electoral outcomes. We

hypothesize that the more diffuse nature of coalition

governments decreases the effect of institutional perfor-

mance on political trust. Below these ve explanations are

summarized:

H2 . Political trust is higher in countries with more poli-

tical parties participating in elections.

H3 . Political trust is higher in countries with more poli-

tical parties in parliament.

235; Listhaug et al., 2009 ). One possible explanation is

the operationalization of proportionality. Often empirical

studies look at the electoral design and divide electoral

systems in three or four categories. This is a rather crude

measure as it looks at the design rather than the effective

electoral outcomes of these systems and ignores the vari-

ance in proportionality within these systems. Some

empirical studies simplify things even more using only two

categories of systems

–

”

which are not only based on electoral rules but take also

other system properties such as the state structure or the

executive into account. Although it is useful to take these

features into account, it becomes dif

“

”

“

majoritarian

and

consensual

cult to disentangle

which features affect political trust. Another explanation is

that both arguments are valid and the two competing

hypotheses

can be brought

together by proposing

H4 . Political trust is lower in countries with more parties

in of

ce.

1 While there was an interaction term for

’

included in the regression explaining political trust, there was no inter-

action between

‘

loser

’

and

‘

new democracy

H5 . Political trust of election losers is higher in countries

with proportional election outcomes than in countries with

disproportional election outcomes.

H6 . The effect of the evaluation of perceived institutional

performance on political trust is stronger when a single

party is in of

was split in four parts according to electoral systems and separate

regressions were run. The different coef

‘

loser

’

and

‘

disproportionality

’

included. Instead, the

’

were not substantially different and missed standard levels of statistical

signi

‘

loser

cients for the variable

cance.

In further analyses comparing

‘

the losers

’

in different

systems, the variable

‘

disproportionality

’

was signi

cant in some cases

ce than a coalition government.

but most often not.

716

S. Marien / Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 712

726

–

5. Data and methods

Table 1

Political trust.

5.1. Presentation of the data and variables

Political trust

Trust in country

’

s parliament

0.875

The third and fourth wave of the European Social

Survey (2006

Trust in political parties

0.945

Trust in politicians

0.933

2008) will be used to assess the relationship

between proportionality and political trust. The European

Social Survey (2006, 2008) provides reliable and up-to-

date information on trust in political institutions in 23

European countries with a substantial range of variation in

proportionality. 2 This dataset is ideally suited for

comparative analysis since particular attention has been

paid to ensure comparability with regards to the ope-

rationalization and cross-cultural validity of concepts in

the participating countries. Data were collected between

2006 and 2009 by means of uniform face-to-face inter-

views among representative samples of the population of

23 European countries ( Jowell et al., 2007, 2009 ). 3 Given

the small time-span between both waves and the rather

stable nature of trust in political institutions on the indi-

vidual level (e.g. Hooghe and Wilkenfeld, 2008 ), wave 3

and wave 4 of the European social survey were merged

into one dataset broadening the number of countries, and

in particular the range in the proportionality of election

outcomes included in the analyses. Response rates varied

by country with a mean of 63% ( Jowell et al., 2007, 2009 ).

Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, we cannot

directly test the causality of the relationship between

election outcomes and political trust.

–

Eigenvalue

2.53

Explained variance (%)

84.30

Extraction method: principal component analysis.

summary of the three items which ranges from 0 to 30

with a mean of 11.33 and a standard deviation of 6.65

(Cronbach

’

: 0.90).

5.1.2. Independent variables

In most empirical research, electoral systems are being

categorized into three or four groups namely majoritarian

systems, mixed (independent or dependent) systems and

proportional systems. However, within these systems there

is a substantial variation in the proportionality of the

election outcomes depending on e.g. district size or legal

thresholds. In order to take this variation into account, we

will use Gallagher

s disproportionality index ( 1991;

Gallagher and Mitchell, 2008 ) that looks at the degree to

which the allocation of seats matches the distribution of

the national vote at the parliamentary elections. 5 High

values on this index indicate disproportional election

outcomes. Given that most authors argue that accumulated

experience with the electoral system (and proportional or

disproportional election outcomes)

’

uences political

trust,

s index of disproportionality was

calculated for each country based on the election outcomes

of the past 10 years. 6 The number of alternatives that is

presented to the electorate is measured by looking at the

number of effective parties contesting elections during the

last election before the survey was administered based

upon Laakso and Taagepera (1979) . 7 The inclusiveness of

the Gallagher

’

5.1.1. Dependent variable

The question on political trust in ESS (2006, 2008) was

phrased:

10 how much you

personally trust each of the institutions I read out.

0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10

means you have complete trust.

“

please tell me on a score of 0

–

The institutions include:

the national parliament, politicians and political parties. 4

Principal component analysis indicated that the three

items loaded strongly on a single dimension, explaining

84.30% of the total variance with an Eigenvalue of 2.53

( Table 1 ). This is in-line with previous research which has

also found trust in political institutions to be one-

dimensional ( Zmerli et al., 2007; Hooghe, 2011 ). Conse-

quently, an index was created as a simple additive

”

5 This index is calculated by taking the square root of the sum of the

squared differences of each party

s relative share of the votes and its rela-

tive share of the seats. In theory, this index can range from 0 to 100. A value

of 0 indicates that all political parties receive the same percentage of seats

than of votes. A value of 100 indicates that Party A e.g. gained all the votes

and none of the seats, while Party B did not get any votes but gets all the

seats. Inpractice, distance between the percentage of votes and seats exists,

however, it is dif

’

cult to justify a large discrepancy as a result high values on

this index are less likely and the range of this index is smaller than 0 to 100.

In effect, the largest value in the sample is 21.95 (France in 2006). In

addition, other indices of (dis)proportionality are also available e.g. Rae

index of disproportionality, Loosemore-Hamby index, Sainte-Lague index,

Rose-index. All these indices look at the difference between the percentage

of votes and the percentage seats partieswin at elections. The

2 More countries were surveyed but not all data is already released.

Moreover, the

eldwork in some countries took place during the elec-

tions or government formation making it dif

cult to calculate winners

and losers. Therefore, some respondents were deleted from the data of

Estonia, Ireland and Sweden. For this reason, the data of the Netherlands

in wave 3 and Ukraine in Wave 4 were also not included.

3 Countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark,

Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Ireland, the

Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Slovakia,

Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

4 Unfortunately, trust in government was not included in the datasets.

But research on political trust shows that trust in political institutions

forms one latent concept. From a theoretical perspective, however, we

can argue that electoral outcomes can have different effects on different

objects of trust. Therefore, all analyses were also performed with as

dependent variable respectively trust in the national parliament, trust in

politicians and trust in political parties. From these additional analyses,

the same conclusions can be drawn.

’

approach of the Gallagher-index, however, prevents that positive and

negative difference cancel each other out. Moreover, this index is oftenused

in research on institutional design.

6 Indices of disproportionality were obtained from www.tcd.ie/

Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/index.php . For every

country included in ESS 2006

‘

least squares

8 an average value of disproportionality

was calculated based on the election outcomes of the past 10 years.

7 In particular, the number of effective parties participating in the last

election before the survey was administered in the country was calcu-

lated for the third wave and the fourth wave. When this was not the same

election, which was often the case, the mean of these two indices was

taken. These indices were retrieved from http://www.tcd.ie/Political_

Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/index.php .

–

Plik z chomika:

Inne pliki z tego folderu:

Inne foldery tego chomika: