Heidegger's Linguistics.pdf

Inquiry ,45,205–16

Symposium:CristinaLafont, Heidegger,Language,andWorld-disclosure *

WasHeideggeraLinguisticIdealist?

TaylorCarman

BarnardCollege,ColumbiaUniversity

CristinaLafont’sfascinatingbook,originallypublishedinGermaneight

yearsago,nowrevisedandtranslatedintoEnglish,makesanimportant

contributiontoHeideggerscholarship,bothinitssensitivitytothehistorical

sourcesinformingHeidegger’sre � ectionsonlanguageandinthewayit

drawsHeideggerintorecentdebatesaboutmeaninginAnglo-American

philosophy.AnyoneinterestedinHeidegger,andespeciallyanyonenot

alreadyconvincedofhisrelevancetocontemporarytheoriesofmindand

language,shouldreadit.Moreover,quiteapartfromitspurelyphilosophical

value,thebookisitselfgoodevidencethattheterms‘continental’and

‘analytic’havenotjustoutlivedtheirusefulness,buthaveforalongtime

beenfunctioningasideologicalobstaclestointerculturalscholarshipand

creativedialoguebetweenphilosophicalstylesandtraditions. Heidegger,

Language,andWorld-disclosure exhibitsanadmirabledisregardforthose

stultifyingcategories.

Nevertheless,I Ž ndmyselfindisagreementwithmostofwhatLafontsays

aboutHeidegger’saccountofmeaningandpracticein BeingandTime andits

supposedlydireepistemologicalconsequences.Lafontargues,inshort,(1)

thatthediscussionofsignsin§17of BeingandTime implies,andindeed

Heideggerbelieves,thatallworldlyintelligibilityislinguisticallyconstituted,

or‘symbolicallystructured’(pp.11,15,29, passim );(2)thatHeidegger

equivocatesbetweentwoincompatibleaccountsofthatintelligibility:one

‘factical’andholistic,theothertranscendentaland(implicitly)subjectivist;

(3)thatheshareswithFregeandHusserl( interalios )theassumptionthat

semanticmeaningdeterminesreference;(4)thathemustthereforedenythat

ournormativeunderstandingofentitiesisrevisableinlightofexperience;and

(5)thatinternalismentailsidealism.Thatsequenceofpropositionsroughly

describesthelogicalorderofLafont’sargument,butitalsochartswhat

strikesmeasitsgraduallydiminishingstagesofimplausibility.Thatistosay,

*CristinaLafont, Heidegger,Language,andWorld-disclosure ,trans.GrahamHarman

(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000),originallypublishedas Spracheund

Welterschliessung:ZurlinguistischenWendederHermeneutikHeideggers (Frankfurtam

Main:Suhrkamp,1994).AllunprefixedpagereferencesaretotheEnglishtranslation.

# 2002Taylor&Francis

206 TaylorCarman

Iamcon Ž dentthat(1)isfalse,I’mcomfortablycertainthat(2)isnottrue,I’m

reasonablysurethat(3)iswrong,I’mdoubtfulabout(4),andIremain

unconvincedof(5).Sincespaceislimited,however,Ishallrestrictmyselfto

the Ž rstthreepointsandleavethelasttwotoothers,ortoanotheroccasion.

ItiscrucialforthesuccessofLafont’sargumentthatsheestablishearlyon

thatthehermeneuticphenomenologyof BeingandTime belongedtothe

‘linguisticturn’inGermanphilosophyinitiatedbyHamann,Herder,and

Humboldtmorethanacenturyearlier.Throughouthiscareer,longbeforethe

muchstronger,moreexplicitclaimshewouldlatermakeconcerningthe

constitutiveroleoflanguageinourunderstandingofbeing,accordingto

Lafont,Heideggeralreadyregardedmeaningandunderstandingasessentially

linguisticphenomena.ForHeidegger,shewrites,‘thearticulationof

intelligibilitycan“haveaspeci Ž callyworldlykindofbeing” onlyin

language ’(p.73).Iwanttoemphasizethatthisthesisisthekeypremiseon

whichtheargumentoftheentirebookrests.Ifthepremiseisfalse,muchof

thesubsequentdiscussion,particularlywithregardtopost-Fregeantheories

ofsenseandreferenceinAnglo-Americanphilosophy,willloseitsrelevance

totheaccountofmeaningandunderstandingin BeingandTime.

AndIthinkthepremiseisfalse.Ialsothink,therefore,thatLafont’s

argumentlargelyfails.Ibelievesheisright,however,thatHeidegger

remainedcommittedtoakindofontologicalapriorism,inspiteofhis

realizationthathumanunderstandingisalwaysessentially‘factical’,whichis

tosaydependentontheonticallyconcrete,historicallycontingentworldwe

Ž ndourselvesthrowninto.ButapriorismisnotthesameasFregeanism,andit

seemstomeHeideggercouldhaveconsistentlyheldalessrigidconceptionof

theontologicalaprioribywayofaccommodatingthemanyanti-Fregeanand

anti-Husserlianthingshedoessayabouttheconcreteworldlyconditionsof

intentionality,meaning,andlinguisticpractice.Lafontcon � atesthe

distinctionbetweenaprioriandaposterioriwiththatbetweenmeaningand

reference;indeed,shecon � atesbothwithathirddistinctionbetweensubject

andobject.Allthreeshouldbekeptseparate.Notallmeaningisontological,

someisontic,andHeideggerisadamantindenyingthatDaseinisanything

likeaconstitutingsubjectstandingoveragainsttheworldasaconstituted

object.Ashesays,‘subjectandobjectdonotcoincidewithDaseinand

world’. 1

Lafont’sargumentforthecentralityoflanguageinHeidegger’saccountof

intelligibilityrestsonthefascinatingifsomewhatsketchystoryhetellsabout

thepragmaticfunctionofsignsin§17of BeingandTime. Theargumentin

§17isthatsignsarenot,ontologicallyspeaking,‘occurrent’( vorhanden )

entitiesstandinginobjectiverelationstootheroccurrententitiesthankstothe

mentalactsorsubjectiveinterpretationsoftheirusers.Theyareinsteadakind

of‘equipment’( Zeug )whosebeingistobe‘available’( zuhanden )foruse.

Butsignsarepeculiar,forwhileequipmentgenerallyremainsinconspic-

WasHeideggeraLinguisticIdealist? 207

uous,sothatourconcerncandwellonthetaskathand,signsfunction

preciselybystandingoutexplicitlytorevealor‘show’( zeigen )something.In

thisway,‘Inourconcernfuldealings,equipmentforshowing[ Zeig-zeug ]gets

usedina special [ vorzu¨glich ]way’( SZ 79).Signsareequipment,butwhereas

equipmenttypicallyrecedesintothebackground,signsfunctionbybeing

conspicuous.Thesigndoesnotjust Ž tneatlyintoaninterlockingnexusof

equipment;itorganizesoursenseofthesituationasawhole:

Thiscircumspectiveoverviewdoesnotgraspwhatisavailable;whatitachievesis

ratheranorientationinourenvironment....Signsofthekindwehavedescribedlet

whatisavailablebeencountered;moreprecisely,theyletsomecontextofitbecome

accessibleinsuchawaythatourconcernfuldealingstakeonanorientationandholdit

secure.(Ibid.)

Morespeci Ž cally,asignis‘ apieceofequipmentthatexplicitlyraisesa

totalityofequipmentintocircumspection,sothattogetherwithittheworldly

characteroftheavailableannouncesitself ’.( SZ 80)

Asignissomethingonticallyavailablethat,asthisde Ž niteequipment,alsofunctions

assomethingindicativeoftheontologicalstructureofavailability,ofreferential

totalities,andofworldliness. Thereinliesthespecialstatusofthisavailablething

withintheenvironmentofcircumspectiveconcern.( SZ 82)

Signsareequipment,then,buttheyhaveaspecial,privilegedstatusinvirtue

oftheircapacitytoshedlightnotjustonsalientaspectsofpracticalsituations,

butonontologicalstructures,too.Signsbringotherequipment,practical

situations,andevenontologicalphenomenaintoviewexplicitly.Onecould

say,then,thatsignsplayakindoftranscendentalroleinuncoveringthe

underlyingontologicalconditionsforourencounterwiththingsinthe

environment.Perhapswecouldtieourshoesandbrushourteeth,butwe

couldneverdophenomenology,norevennegotiateacrowdedintersection,

withoutthehelpofsigns.

Sofar,sogood.ButLafontinterpretsthetranscendentalstatusofsignsina

farmoreradicalway.Onheraccount,shoelacesandtoothbrushesthemselves

couldneverevenshowupforusasintelligibleequipmentintheabsenceof

signs,sincesignsarethemselvesresponsibleforconstitutingcontextsof

equipmentinthe Ž rstplace.LafontsaysthatHeideggertreatssigns‘asa

paradigmaticcase’ofequipment,which‘leadshimtofeeljusti Ž edin

generalizingtheresultsoftheanalysis’tohisaccountofthepragmatic

interconnectednessoftheequipmentalcontextatlarge,whichhesays

consistsinakindofteleological‘reference’( Verweisung )(p.31). 2 But

Heideggerclearlyregardssignsanexceptionalcase,notexemplaryor

generalizable.

Lafontalsomaintainsthat,forHeidegger,‘the understanding ofa

referentialtotality,likeeveryunderstanding,mustbeclari Ž edonthebasis

ofthestructureofthesign’(pp.31–32);thatHeideggermakes‘useofthe

208 TaylorCarman

sign-structureforexplainingtheconstitutionoftheworld’(p.37);that‘the

systemofsigns-relations...constitutestheworld’(p.43n40).Butthisisjust

theoppositeofwhatHeideggersays.Whathesaysisthatthestructureofthe

signmustbeclari Ž edonthebasisofthefunctioningofequipment,not vice

versa ,sinceasignjustisapieceofequipment,albeitofaveryspecialkind.

Asheputsthepointinhislecturesof1925,‘ theonticshowing [ofsigns] is

groundedinthestructureofreference ’.Thereferenceofsigns,however,‘is

nottheshowing,ratherthelatteristhattowhichthereferencerefers’.So,

‘Justasahammeris for hammering,sothesignis for showing,butthis

referenceofserviceabilityinthestructureoftheenvironmentalthinghammer

doesnotmakethehammerasign.’ 3

Thatis,thepracticalreferringofahammer,thewayit Ž tsintoan

equipmentalcontextasawhole,liesnotjustinthehammeringofthehammer,

notjustinitscontactwithahandatoneendandanailattheother,butina

multitudeofequipmentalinterconnections,forinstance,itsplaceonthewall

orinthetoolbox.Sotoo,thereferringofasignliesinthewayit Ž tsintoa

practiceasawhole,notjustinitsshowingsomething,say,apathinawood,

oranapproachingstorm.Hammersarehammersandsignsaresignsonlyby

referringintheequipmentalsense,buthammeringandshowingdonot

exhausttheequipmentalreferenceofhammersandsigns.Tryingtoaccount

fortheavailabilityofequipmentatlargeintermsoftheshowingofsigns,

Heideggerseemstobesaying,wouldbeliketryingtoaccountforitinterms

ofhammeringorgluingorpainting.

OnLafont’saccount,bycontrast,signsarenot basedon butrather formthe

basisof equipmentalreferenceasawhole.Insupportofthismuchstronger

transcendentalreading,shetwicequotesHeidegger’sremarknearthe

beginningof§17that‘being-a-sign-forcanitselfbeformalizedintoa

universalkindofrelation ,sothatthesign-structureitselfprovidesan

ontologicalcluefor“characterizing”allentitiesingeneral’( SZ 77)(cf.pp.

32,33).Sheseemstotakethiscommentatfacevalue,asifHeideggerwere

endorsingthenotionthatanyandeveryentitycanberegardedasasign,oras

beinguncoveredonlyinvirtueofsigns.

Butinfacttheremarkmeansjusttheopposite.Concerning‘signs’,

Heideggerwrites,‘Manythingsarenamedbythisword:notonlydifferent

kinds ofsigns,butbeing-a-sign-forcanitselfbeformalizedintoa universal

kindofrelation ,sothatthesign-structureitselfprovidesanontologicalclue

for“characterizing”allentitiesingeneral’( SZ 77).Thepointisthatindoing

phenomenologywemustfocusonsomeconcretelyspeci Ž edphenomenon,

since,looselyspeaking,anythingandeverythingcanbecalleda‘sign’.Ifwe

arenotcareful,weareliabletomissthephenomenaaltogetherand Ž nd

ourselvestalkingabouteverythingandnothing.ThatthisisHeidegger’spoint

becomesobviousifwecomparethepassagein BeingandTime withits

textualprecursorinthe1925lectures,whichisworthquotingatlength:

WasHeideggeraLinguisticIdealist? 209

[T]heuniversalscopeofphenomenasuchassignsandsymbolseasilygivesriseto

usingthemasaclueforinterpretingthetotalityofentities,theworldasawhole.No

lessa Ž gurethanLeibnizsoughtinhis characteristicauniversalis asystematizationof

thetotalityofentitiesintermsofanorientationtothephenomenonofthesign.

RecentlySpengler,followingtheprocedureofLamprecht,haselaboratedtheideaof

thesymbolforthephilosophyofhistoryandmetaphysicsingeneral,withoutoffering

anyproperlyscienti Ž cclari Ž cationoftherangeofphenomenatherebyindicated.

Finally,inhiswork, ThePhilosophyofSymbolicForms ,Cassirerhastriedtoexplain

thevariousdomainsoflife–language,knowledge,religion,myth–inafundamental

wayasphenomenaoftheexpressionofspirit.Hehaslikewisesoughttobroadenthe

critiqueofreason providedbyKantintoa critiqueofculture. Here,too,the

phenomenonofexpression,ofsymbolinthewidestsense,istakenasacluefor

explaininghenceforthallphenomenaofspiritandofentitiesingeneral.Theuniversal

applicabilityofsuchformalcluesas‘gestalt’,‘sign’,‘symbol’inthiswayeasily

obscurestheprimordialityornonprimordialityoftheinterpretationtherebyachieved.

Whatmightbeanappropriateapproachforaestheticphenomenacanleadtoprecisely

theoppositeofanelucidationorinterpretationinthecaseofotherphenomena....It

isobviousthatinterpretiveeffortsofthekinddescribed,takingupthecluesofsuch

universalphenomena,ofwhichanythingandeverythingcanbemade–forultimately

anythingandeverythingcanbeinterpretedasasign–poseagreatdangerforthe

developmentofthehumansciences.( PGZ ,pp.276–8,emphasisadded)

Farfromrepresentinghisownview,then,suchappealstogeneralnotions

suchastheconceptofasignorasymbolbywayofexplainingintelligibility

atlargeareplainlyanathematoHeidegger.Ifthepeculiaritiesofsignsseem

toofferasinglekeywithwhichtounlockthesecretontologicalconstitution

ofentitiesingeneral,weareindangerofignoringthephenomena– the

‘ thingsthemselves ’–infavorofaprefabricatedinterpretiveschema,precisely

thesortofhermeneuticalcravingforgeneralityandneatnessthatHeideggeris

alwaysatpainstoresistandcondemn.Lafont,itseemstome,hasmisreadthe

textandsuccumbedtotemptationininsistingthat,forHeideggerhimself,‘the

worldas“awholeofsigni Ž cance”is...ofasymbolicnature’(48).Atone

pointsheeventreatstheterms‘ontological’and‘symbolical’assynonymous

(p.18n11).Itisnoaccident,Ithink,thatHeideggerneversaysanythinglike

thisin BeingandTime.

TheconfusioniscompoundedbythecloselinkLafontforgesbetweentwo

termsthatfunctionquiteseparatelyinHeidegger’saccount,namely‘sign’

( Zeichen )and‘signify’( be-deuten ). 4 Theaf Ž liationemergestacitlyinsection

1.2.2,andthenexplicitatthebeginningof1.3:

Withhisanalysisofsigns,Heideggerfocusesonandexplainsaparticularkindof

reference,namely‘signifying’.Oncethishasbeendone,hebelievesthathis

interpretationofthesignasanexemplarycaseofequipmentjusti Ž eshimin

identifyingthetwoinacertainway.Thereferenceofthesign(andhenceits

‘signifying’)isheldtobeofthesamekindastheteleological‘reference’of

equipmenttothe‘towards-which’ofits‘serviceability’,theverypointfromwhichthe

analysisofequipmentbegan.(p.40)

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