Heidegger And The Problem Of Idealism.pdf

Inquiry ,43,403–12

HeideggerandtheProblemofIdealism

PiotrHoffman

UniversityofNevada,Reno

WasHeideggera‘realist’oran‘idealist’?Theissuehasbeenandcontinuestobe

hotlydebatedinHeideggerscholarship.Hereitisarguedthatthemuchmore

desirablerealisticinterpretationofHeideggercanbesustained,providedhistheoryof

moodsisgivenitsdue.Moods,Iargue,arenotonly‘equiprimordial’withDasein’s

understandingofbeing,butarealsoirreducibletothelatter.Itisoftenheld–

correctly,asitseemstotheauthor–thatHeidegger’sidealismisallbutinevitableif

Dasein’sawarenessofentitiesisgroundedonlyinDasein’sunderstandingofbeing.

Butin BeingandTime Heideggerspeaksalsoofhowwhatthereisis‘disclosed

moodwise’.Theessaycloselyanalyzesthisspeci Ž callymoodymodeofdisclosure,

andshowsbothitsautonomy vis-a`-vis theunderstandingofbeinganditsfunctionof

securing,forDasein,anaccesstoatrulyindependentreality.

Halfacenturyago,AlphonsedeWaelhens,atthattimeperhapsEurope’s

mostin � uentialHeideggercommentator,wasconcludinghisexaminationof

Heidegger’s‘early’philosophyonaratherpessimisticnote.Accordingtode

Waelhens,Heideggerisinnopositiontoescapethethreatofidealism.

Entitiesarerenderedintelligible,bothintheiressence and intheirexistence,

onlyonthebasisofDasein’sunderstandingoftheirbeing.Consequently,any

ascription,toentities,ofanexistencetrulyindependentofDaseinmustbe

deemedunintelligibleandcontradictory. 1 Recently,theargumenthasbeen

renewed,albeitfromasomewhatdifferentangle,byWilliamBlattner. 2

Blattner’sclaimisabitweakerthandeWaelhens’:theascription,toentities,

ofaDasein-independentstatusisnot,perhaps,altogetherunintelligibleand

contradictory,butitiscertainlydevoidoftruthvalue.Blattnerarrivesatthis

conclusionbyfocusinguponthefunctionofHeideggeriantemporality.

TemporalityisboththemeaningofDasein’sownbeingandthehorizonofthe

meaningofthebeingofentitiesotherthanDasein.Toaskwhetherentitiesare

dependentorindependent vis-a`-vis Daseinmeanstoapplythecategoryof

existencebeyondtheboundariesofitspermissibleuse–beyondthe

boundariesofDasein’stemporalunderstandingofbeing.Andso,theonly

legitimateapplicationofthecategoryofexistencetoentitiesotherthan

DaseinisrelativetoDasein’sownunderstandingofthebeingofthese

entities.

Whicheverwayweinterpretit,thethreatofHeideggerian‘idealism’is

veryreal.Infact,justaboutallthetraditionalconceptualdevicesemployedin

thepasttosetasidesuchathreatseemtofail,oftenveryopenly,inthecaseof

Heidegger.Nothingcanbemoresigni Ž cant,inthisrespect,thanHeidegger’s

# 2000Taylor&Francis

404 PiotrHoffman

ownclari Ž cationoftheconceptsof‘initself’and‘inthemselves’asapplied

toentities.TheseexpressionshaveadistinctlyKantian � avor,butthisisnot

howHeideggerchoosestounderstandthem;theHeideggerianbeing‘initself’

ofentitieshasnothingtodowiththeKantianthinginitself,orthingsin

themselves,underlyingthespatio-temporalphenomenalworld.Quitethe

contrary:onthisparticularissueHeideggerexplicitlyendorseswhatcanonly

beviewedasaradicalversionofidealism.Ifwespeakofentitiesasbeing‘in

themselves’,wedosoonlybecausewe‘understandandconceptualize’

preciselysucha‘characteristicofBeing’. 3 Andsinceall‘characteristicsof

being’arerelativetoDasein,the‘initself’statusofentitiesisalsorelativeto

Dasein.Norshoulditbesupposedthatbyspeakingoftheentities’being‘in

themselves’Heideggerusesthistermonlyinsomepurelytechnicalfashion,

unrelatedtowhatwemeanineverydaylifewhenwespeakplainlyofthings

as‘independent’ofus.Fortheentities’‘independence’too,andforthesame

reason,isinterpretedbyHeideggerasanontologicalcharacteristicderivative

fromDasein’sunderstandingofBeing(BT,p.251).Tobesure,Heidegger

alsostatesthatonly‘Being(notentities)isdependentupontheunderstanding

ofBeing’(BT,p.255).Heelaboratesonthis,explainingthat‘entities are ,

quiteindependentlyofthatexperiencebywhichtheyaredisclosed,the

acquaintanceinwhichtheyarediscovered,andthegraspinginwhichtheir

natureisascertained’(BT,p.228).But,takenastheyare,andattheirface

value,thesestatementsfailtoremovethethreatofidealism.Certainly,since

Heideggerrejectsexplicitly‘psychological’idealism(BT,p.251),entities

cannotbeviewedasdependentuponourmentalactsofexperience,

apprehension,andsoon.Butthisdoesnothingtoabolishtheirdependence

uponourunderstandingoftheirbeing,forexactlythesamereasonasKant’s

empiricalrealismdoesnothingtoabolishhistranscendentalidealism.Aslong

asentitiesaresaidtobeintelligibleonlyintermsofourunderstandingof

being–andthis,notjustintheiressence,butintheirexistenceaswell,as

Heideggermakesitabundantlyclearinthe BasicProblemsofPhenomen-

ology (BPP,pp.205,212)–wecannotencounterthemintheirindependence

fromus.Toencounterthemassoindependent,wewouldhavetoencounter

themasstrippedofanyintelligibility,astotallyalienandundomesticated vis-

a`-vis ourhumanDasein.

Wouldsuchawayofgainingaccesstoentitiesbeeven possible forthe

DaseinofHeidegger’searlywritings?Hisintention,atleast,seemsclear.He

thinksthatweare,afterall,awareof nature and(intheearlyHeideggerat

least)natureispreciselythatalien,undomesticatedrealitycontrastedwiththe

man-made world .Theworld,saysHeidegger,‘is...a...characteristicof

Dasein’(BT,p.92),‘theworldis,sotospeak,Dasein-ish’(BPP,p.166).In

thisrespecttheworldisverydifferentfromnature.ToquoteHeideggeragain,

‘Worldisonly,if,andasDaseinexists.NaturecanalsobewhennoDasein

exists’(BPP,p.170).Totheextent,then,thatDaseindiscoversnatureas

HeideggerandtheProblemofIdealism 405

Heideggerunderstandsithere,Daseinhasaccesstoatrulyindependent

reality.

Butthequestionremains: can Daseindiscovernatureasnatureishere

contrastedwiththeman-made,intelligible,anddomesticatedworld?

Certainly,thiscan’tapplytonatureunderstoodasready-to-hand,aswhen

Heideggerspeaksfamouslyof‘thewood[as]aforestoftimber,themountain,

aquarryofrock’(BT,p.100).Thisisclearlypartofthehumanized‘world’,

sustainedbyoureverydayunderstandingofthebeingofnature.Butthen

natureasready-to-handhasitsboundaryconditionsinnatureaspresent-at-

hand.‘Hammer,tongsandneedle,referinthemselvestosteel,iron,metal,

mineral,wood,inthattheyconsistinthese’(BT,p.100).Now,thepresent-at-

handnatureisoftenencountered within theworld,butHeideggeralsoallows

forourencounterwithan‘unworldly’and‘unmeaning’present-at-hand

nature.Hespeaksofnatureinthisparticularsenseinakeypassageof Being

andTime inwhichhepointsouthowsuchan‘unworldly’and‘unmeaning’

naturecan‘breakin’uponDaseinandevendestroyit(BT,p.193).Insuch

passages,itseems,Heideggermeansclearlynatureasanalien,undomes-

ticatedregionofrealitytowhichDasein Ž ndsitselfvulnerable.

ButhowdoesDaseinbecomeevenawareofnatureassounderstood?We

cannoticeimmediatelyhowHeideggertakesawaywithonehandwhathe

giveswiththeother.Eveninthesamekeypassageof BeingandTime the

‘unworldly’and‘unmeaning’statusofnatureisitselfidenti Ž edasnature’s

‘ontologicalcharacteristic’.ButDasein,andDaseinalone,positsontological

characteristicsofentities,allthewaydowntoentities’veryexistence.The

present-at-handassuchand,wenowsee,thepeculiarmeaningofthepresent-

at-handas‘unworldly’and‘unmeaning’,isdependentuponDasein’s

understandingofbeing.Toputitplainly,thestatusofentitiesasindependent

fromDaseinonaccountoftheirunmeaningnessandunworldlinessisitself

nothingotherthanDasein’sconception.Partofwhatisinvolvedinthis

conceptionisjustthis:we conceive entitiesasindependentofus.Butthisdoes

notentailthepropositionthatthereareinfactsuchentitiesorthatwehave

someaccesstothem.

However,inwhatfollowsIarguethatHeideggerdoeshaveawayof

escapingtheidealisticconsequencesofhisdoctrineofDasein’sunder-

standingofbeing.Itake,asmypointofdeparture,Heidegger’softenquoted,

andoftendismissed,statementsfromthelecture WhatisMetaphysics .In

anxiety,nihilation‘discloses...beingsintheirfullbutheretoforeconcealed

strangenessaswhatisradicallyother’.Andagain:‘onlybecausethenothing

ismanifestinthegroundofDaseincanthetotalstrangenessofbeings

overwhelmus’. 4 Weneednotgobeyondthetextof WhatisMetaphysics to

seewhymanypeopletendtodismissthosestatements.Forintheverysame

lectureHeideggertellsusthat‘inthefaceofanxietyallutteranceofthe“is”

fallssilent’(ibid.,p.103).And,ifthisistrue,thenthe‘radicallyother’saidto

406 PiotrHoffman

bedisclosedinanxietyeludesnotonlyDasein’severydayunderstandingof

being,butDasein’sverycapacitytounderstandentitiesintheirexistence.

Unlesswecan Ž ndsomealternativewayofdisclosingentitiesintheir

existence–alternativetotheirbeingdisclosedinDasein’sunderstandingof

being–weseemtobeinvolvedinahopelessventure.

Butthereissuchanalternativewayofdisclosingentities,andthisis

preciselywhatallowsustodisclosethemasgenuinelyindependentfrom

Daseinanditsworld.In TheMetaphysicalFoundationsofLogic (hereafter

MFL),Heideggercommentsinthefollowingwayonthesubject-matterof

philosophyingeneralandof BeinginTime inparticular.‘Letuskeepinmind

thatphilosophy,as Ž rstphilosophy,hasatwofoldcharacter:theknowledgeof

beingandtheknowledgeoftheoverwhelming.(Thistwofoldcharacter

correspondstothetwofoldin BeingandTime ofexistenceandthrownness)’

(MFL,p.11).Andso,itturnsout,ourknowledgeofbeingisonlyoneofthe

twowaysofdisclosingentities,sincetheycanalsobedisclosedinour

knowledgeoftheoverwhelming.The Ž rstkindofknowledgeisachievedon

thelevelofDasein’sexistence,thatis,intermsofprojectionand

understanding.Thesecondtypeofknowledgeisachievedonthelevelof

Dasein’sthrownness,thatis,throughourstate-of-mind,ourmoods.The

moodofanxiety,then,disclosestoustherealityofentitiesas‘overwhelming’

us.

Isthemetaphysicalmoodofanxietythe only moodinwhichwecan

apprehendthatalien,undomesticatedoverwhelmingnessofentities?No.In

theordinarymoods,too,somesenseofthisstatusofentitiesispreserved.

Speakingoftheordinarymoods–speakingof all ofthem–Heideggersays:

‘themoodbringsDaseinbeforethe“thatitis”ofits“there”,which,assuch,

staresitinthefacewiththeinexorabilityofanenigma’(BT,p.175).But

Dasein’sown‘there’isthe‘there’inthemidstofentities.Andsotheytoo,as

partsofDasein’s‘there’,are‘disclosedmoodwise’(thisisHeidegger’s

expression:BT,p.173)inthesameway.This‘inexorabilityofanenigma’

withwhichDasein’s‘there’isdisclosedrepresentsawatered-down,everyday

counterpartoftheoverwhelmingnessandstrangenessofbeingsastheyare

disclosedinanxiety.Theinexorableiswhatoverwhelms,overpowers,and

overtakesDasein.Butthismuststillbetheinexorabilityofan‘enigma’,forit

ispriorto,anditeludes,ourrationalexplanationsandjusti Ž cations.

EverythingIwillsayfromnowonwillbeanelaborationuponthesetwo

mainpoints:(1)Heideggerdoeshaveawayofescapingidealismbecause,

asidefromDasein’sknowledgeofbeing,heallowsforDasein’sknowledgeof

theoverwhelming;and(2)thisknowledgeoftheoverwhelmingispresent,

howeverdimly,intheordinarymoods,andtheeverydayDaseinisthereby

givenanaccesstogenuinelyindependentbeings.Thus,onboththe

metaphysicalandtheeverydaylevelthemenaceofidealismcanberemoved.

The Ž rstquestionInowwanttoraiseisthis.Inhis Metaphysical

HeideggerandtheProblemofIdealism 407

FoundationsofLogic ’scommentson BeingandTime Heideggeris

categorical:thedistinctionbetweentheknowledgeofbeingandthe

knowledgeoftheoverwhelmingissaidtobeoperativein BeingandTime

itself.Sincethereisnoexplicitanalysisofthisinthetextof BeingandTime ,

wemust Ž rstseeiftheconceptionofanxietydevelopedin Whatis

Metaphysics (anxietyisthemoodinwhichtheoverwhelmingnessofentities

isdisclosedonthemetaphysicallevel)isnotatoddswithwhatissaidabout

anxietyinthetextof BeingandTime .

LetmestartwiththefollowingdistinctiondrawnbyHeideggerin Being

andTime .‘Anxiety[saysHeidegger]canmountauthenticallyonlyina

Daseinwhichisresolute.Hewhoisresolute...understandsthepossibility

ofanxietyasthepossibilityoftheverymoodwhichneitherinhibitsnor

bewildershim’(BT,p.395).Thedistinctionhereisbetween,ontheonehand,

Dasein’s understanding ofanxietyand,ontheotherhand,the actual

mounting ofanxiety.Itisnotunlikethedistinctionbetweenone’sreadiness

forgraceandone’sbeingintheactualstateofgrace.Indeedresolutnessitself

isdescribedasa‘reticentself-projectionuponone’sownmostBeing-guilty,

inwhichoneisready-for-anxiety’(BT,p.343).Assuchareadiness-for-

anxietyresolutenesspreparesDaseinfortheactualexperienceofanxiety.

Still,beingreadyforanxietyandbeingintheactualstateofanxietyarevery

different.Inone’sreadiness-for-anxietytheeverydayworlddoesnotcollapse

intoinsigni Ž cance;noristheready-for-anxietyDaseinaffectedbythat

‘radicalotherness’ofbeingstheanxiousDaseinisexposedto.Andthatisso

becauseinmerereadiness-for-anxietyanxietyisstillunderstoodasa

possibility,thatis,itisstillapprehendedfromwithinDasein’sprojection

towardsthefuture.

Itisotherwisewiththeactualstateofanxiety,asisdemonstratedby

Heidegger’sanalysisofthetemporalityofanxiety.Thisformoftemporality

differsnotonlyfromtheinauthenticbutevenfromtheauthenticformof

temporality.Inthetemporalityofanxietythepastisneithertheinauthentic

forgettingandremembering,norisittheauthenticrepeating.Andthepresent

ofthetemporalityofanxietyisneithertheinauthenticmakingpresentnorisit

theauthenticmomentofvision(BT,p.394).Inthetemporalityofanxiety,

Dasein‘istakenallthewaybacktoitsnakeduncanninessanditbecomes

fascinatedbyit’(ibid.);here‘anxiety...bringsonebacktothepure‘that-it-

is’ofone’sownmostindividualizedthrownness’(ibid.)whereDasein Ž nds

itselfinthemidstofentities.Sinceinanxietytheentirecontextof

intelligibilitycollapses,entitiesarenowstrippedoftheirdomesticated,

worldlysigni Ž cance,andDaseincandiscoverthemintheirradicalotherness.

This,however,cannotmean,anditdoesnotmean,thatunderstandingas

suchisaltogethermissinginthetemporalityofanxiety.Asageneral

proposition,moodandunderstandingareequiprimordial.Concerninganxiety

itself,Heideggerstatesclearlythatanxietyis‘anunderstandingstate-of-

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