The Asian Conventional Military Balance in 2006.pdf

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

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The Asian Conventional Military

Balance in 2006:

Overview of major Asian Powers

Anthony H. Cordesman

Martin Kleiber

Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

Researcher

acordesman@aol.com

mkleiber@csis.org

Working Draft for Review and Comment

Revised, June 26, 2006

Cordesman & Kleiber: Overview of major Asian powers

6/26/06

Page 2

Introduction

The rise of China as a major power has triggered a new debate over the military balance

in Asia, but it is only one of the trends shaping regional military forces. Taiwan’s

faltering military development has helped destabilize the Taiwan Straits. Japan is

reasserting its strategic role in the region, causing tension with both China and South

Korea. North Korea’s persistence in creating nuclear forces is changing the balance on

the Korean Peninsula, as are cuts in US forces. The shift in US forces from Okinawa to

Guam, and increased US reliance on long-range strike forces is also affecting the balance.

There are fewer signs of significant shifts in the balance in Southeast Asia. The major

change in the threat has been the emergence of transnational threats from neo-Salafi

Islamist extremists, and continuing internal ethnic, sectarian, and tribal tensions. The

main concern is internal security and not the military balance.

In the case of South Asia, Indian and Pakistan continue to build-up their nuclear and

missile forces, and India is seeking to expand its strategic reach in the Indian Ocean area.

Kashmir remains a potential military fault line. Once again, however, the emergence of

transnational threats from neo-Salafi Islamist extremists, and continuing internal ethnic,

sectarian, and tribal tensions dominates the security problems in the region. Like the rest

of Asia, internal security has become a dominant concern.

The following analysis of quantitative force strength and trends can only address some of

these issues. It focuses on conventional and nuclear forces, military spending, and other

quantifiable aspects of the military balance. As such, it can only touch on a few aspects of

force quality, and cannot begin to address the problem of internal security. There is no

way to portray the relative strength of ideology and religion, and counts of the manpower

strength of non-state actors are virtually meaningless.

It is important, however, to look beyond debates over strategy and possible intentions and

to consider those facts that can actually be measured. Far too often analysts pick key

trends out of context, and exaggerate the overall presence or build-up of opposing

military forces. Data on military spending are taken out of context, as are arms purchases

that may introduce important new military technologies and capabilities but only have a

limited impact on overall force modernization.

Accordingly, the tables and charts that follow are not intended to provide a

comprehensive picture of military capability or effort. They are only intended to be a tool

that provides perspective. It is also important to recognize that they do have significant

uncertainties. The sources they are drawn from are unclassified, and have many gaps and

contradictions. The authors have had to extrapolate in some cases, and use a mix of

sources in others. The data and trends shown are almost certainly broadly correct, but

there is no way to create such an analysis that is precise and certain.

Cordesman & Kleiber: Overview of major Asian powers

6/26/06

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Trends in Military Expenditures

In theory, comparisons of military expenditures provide a basis for making comparisons

of overall effort. In practice, countries report in such different ways, and pay such

different costs for given types of forces that such comparisons are at best of broad value.

The problem is further compounded in the case of state-dominated economies and largely

conscript military forces. In both cases, the state does not pay anything approaching

market prices, and the only way to develop comparability is to make a separate estimate

of the comparable cost of a nation’s forces in market terms.

• Figure 1 does show, however, that Asian and US military expenditures have

dominated recent increases in military spending, and that China has dominated the

increases in Asia.

• Figure 2 shows these trends are equally true when spending is measured in

constant 2006 dollars, although the real increase in US and Chinese spending is

much smaller.

• Figure 3 looks only at regional spending in Asia. Chinese spending again drives

the overall regional increase, but Australia, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, North

Korea, South Korea, and Vietnam all made major increases in military spending

relative to their previous national spending during 1999-2005.

• Figure 4 shows the same data as Figure 3, but in constant 2006 dollars. Once

again, the rate and scale of increases is significantly smaller than in current

dollars.

• Figures 5 and 6 compare the spending trends of the major Asian powers in current

and constant dollars. In both figures, China emerges are the dominant regional

spending, vastly outpacing Japan. The real level of the Chinese increase could

also be much higher. Many experts believe that an estimate of Chinese spending

based on comparable cost would put annual Chinese spending at well over $100

billion by 2005.

• Figures 5 and 6 show that Taiwan has made no attempt to react to the increase in

Chinese effort and has actually sharply reduced its real military spending. It has

effectively forced the US to spend for Taiwan’s defense.

• Figures 5 and 6 show that South Korea greatly outspends North Korea, but that

North Korea has increased its military spending more quickly. North Korean

expenditures are low, however, because state determination of prices and the

ability to enforce very low manpower costs. Its expenditures would be

significantly higher if measured in comparable prices.

• Figures 5 and 6 show that India outspent Pakistan by 4:1 in 1999, and that this

disparity had increased to 5:1 by 2005.

Cordesman & Kleiber: Overview of major Asian powers

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Page 4

List of Tables and Charts

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 2

TRENDS IN MILITARY EXPENDITURES............................................................................................. 3

Figure 1: World Military Expenditures: 1999-2005..........................................................................5

Figure 2: World Military Expenditures: 1999-2005..........................................................................6

Figure 3: Asian Military Expenditures: 1999-2005..........................................................................7

Figure 4: Asian Military Expenditures: 1999-2005..........................................................................8

Figure 5: Military Expenditures by the Major Asian Powers: 1999-2005 ........................................9

Figure 6: Military Expenditures by the Major Asian Powers: 1999-2005 .....................................10

THE OVERALL REGIONAL MILITARY BALANCE ........................................................................ 11

Force Quantity versus Force Quality: The Advantages of New Tactics, Technology,

and Training in Conventional Warfare ......................................................................... 11

The Vulnerabilities of Less Advanced Powers ............................................................. 13

Limits to Conventional Military Forces and the Challenge of Asymmetric Warfare... 16

Threat of Asymmetric Innovation................................................................................. 18

The Meaning of Quantitative Comparisons.................................................................. 22

Figure 7: Asian Military Forces in 2006: Part 1.............................................................................24

Figure 7: Asian Military Forces in 2006: Part 2..............................................................................25

Figure 8: US Forces in the Pacific in 2006: Part 1 ..........................................................................26

Figure 8: US Forces in the Pacific in 2006: Part 2 .........................................................................27

Figure 9: The Nuclear Dimension: Part 1.......................................................................................28

Figure 9: The Nuclear Dimension: Part 2.......................................................................................29

THE MAJOR ASIAN POWERS .............................................................................................................. 30

Figure 10: Comparative Mil. Strength of Mjr. Asian Powers and Global Power Blocs in 2006.....31

Figure 11: Total Military Manpower in Selected Major Military Powers: 2006............................32

Figure 12: Asian Military Manpower by Service: 2006.................................................................33

Figure 13: Asian Military Manpower in Key Powers by Service: 2006 ........................................34

Figure 14: Manpower in Key Asian Powers: 1999-2006 ................................................................35

Figure 15: Asian Main Battle Tanks: 2006 .....................................................................................36

Figure 16: Main Battle Tanks in Key Asian Powers: 1999-2006....................................................37

Figure 17: Asian Armored Fighting Vehicles: 2006 .......................................................................38

Figure 18: Asian Land Weapons in Key Powers: 2006...................................................................39

Figure 19: Asian Artillery Strength: 2006......................................................................................40

Figure 20: Asian Fixed and Rotary Wing Combat Aircraft: 2006 .................................................41

Figure 21: Asian Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft: 2006...................................................................42

Figure 22: Asian Rotary Wing Combat Aircraft: 2006 ..................................................................43

Figure 23: Fixed Winged Combat Aircraft* in Key Asian Powers: 1999-2006.............................44

Figure 24: Asian Naval Combat Ships: 2006 .................................................................................45

Figure 25: Asian Naval Combat Ships in Key Powers: 2006.........................................................46

Figure 26: Western Naval Combat Ships Affecting the Asian Balance: 2006 ...............................47

Cordesman & Kleiber: Overview of major Asian powers

6/26/06

Page 5

Figure 1: World Military Expenditures: 1999-2005

(In $US Billions, current)

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

*2004

*2005

Sub-Saharan Africa

9.8

8.8

7.1

7.7

10.3

9.7

MENA

60.0

59.9

54.8

52.1

54.1

57.2

62.4

Carib/Lat America

35.3

35.9

30.5

25.3

25.1

25.6

32.4

**China

39.9

42.0

43.6

51.2

55.9

62.5

80.0

East Asia

135.2

143.2

137.5

150.1

164.4

184.8

192.7

Cent ral/Sout h Asia

21.0

22.9

22.5

22.0

24.4

29.3

35.2

***FSU-Russia

56.8

52.0

46.1

50.8

65.2

61.9

65.0

Non-NAT O Europe

20.0

25.8

24.7

26.8

30.1

23.4

19.3

NAT O Europe

173.3

173.0

169.3

197.4

221.1

235.0

201.5

292.1

304.1

305.5

348.6

404.9

466.0

518.1

T ot al NAT O

473.8

477.1

474.8

545.9

626.0

712.4

730.5

T ot al Europe

193.3

198.8

194.0

224.2

251.3

258.4

220.7

World

812.0

825.7

798.1

880.8

997.2

1,094.8

1,147.2

Source: Based primarily on material in the IISS Military Balance 1998-1999 to 2005-2006 , London, Routledge, 2005 plus data drawn

from USPACOM sources and US experts. Some data estimated or corrected by the authors. *2004 and 2005 data estimates are partly

based on appropriated defense budgets for these years; **US experts’ estimates; *** Data for Russia and China are based on PPP

exchange rates.

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