Edward J. Erickson - Defeat in Detail, The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913 (2003).pdf - Historia - Bałkany - Jugosławia - MMarkMMark

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Cover

title:

Defeat in Detail : The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-

1913

author:

Erickson, Edward J.

publisher:

Greenwood Publishing Group

isbn10 | asin:

0275978885

print isbn13:

9780275978884

ebook isbn13:

9780313051791

language:

English

subject

Balkan Peninsula--History--War of 1912-1913--Campaigns,

Turkey--History, Military--20th century.

publication date:

2003

lcc:

DR46.4.E75 2003eb

ddc:

949.6

subject:

Balkan Peninsula--History--War of 1912-1913--Campaigns,

Turkey--History, Military--20th century.

cover

Page i

Defeat in Detail

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Defeat in Detail

The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913

Edward J.Erickson

Foreword by Briton C.Busch

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Erickson, Edward J., 1950–

Defeat in detail: The Ottoman army in the Balkans, 1912–13/Edward J.

Erickson. p. cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

cover

ISBN 0-275-97888-5 (alk. paper)

1. Balkan Peninsula—History—War of 1912–1913—Campaigns. 2. Turkey

—History, Military—20th century. I. Title.

DR46.4.E75 2003

949.6–dc21 2002026961

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.

reproduced, by any process or technique, without the

express written consent of the publisher.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2002026961

ISBN: 0-275-97888-5

First published in 2003

Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881

An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.

www.praeger.com

Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the

Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National

Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984).

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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For my father and grandfather,

Corporal Donald E.Erickson, United States Army Air Force,

27th Fighter Group, Italy, France, Germany, 1944–1945,

and

Sergeant First Class Edward O.Erickson, United States Army,

American Expeditionary Force, France, 1918–1919

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Page vii

Contents

Illustrations

Foreword by Briton C.Busch

xiii

Preface

xvii

Acknowledgments

xxiii

Defeat and Military Reform, 1877–1910

Revolution and the Eastern Question, 1877–1912

Nexus of Disaster, 1911–1912

The Thracian Campaigns, 1912

The Macedonian Campaigns, 1912

163

The Greek and Montenegrin Campaigns, 1912

211

The Armistice and Military Politics

243

The Thracian Campaigns, 1913

251

The Western Theater: Greece and Albania, 1913

293

10.

Final Operations

317

11.

Defeat in Detail: Conclusion

331

Appendix A:

Ottoman Aviation, Prelude to Military Use of Aircraft

347

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Appendix B:

Ottoman Regular Army Order of Battle, 1911

371

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Appendix C:

List of Place Names

385

Selected Bibliography

387

Index

395

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Illustrations

FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Ottoman Army Organization, 1908 and 1911

Figure 4.1 Ottoman Command Architecture, October 29-November 2, 1912

110

MAPS

Map 1.1 Ottoman Army Areas, 1908

Map 1.2 Ottoman Army Areas, 1911

Map 2.1 The Operational Theater, 1912

Map 3.1 Ottoman Strategic Centers of Gravity, 1912

Map 4.1 Eastern Army Operational Plan, Based on Orders Issued October 21, 1912

Map 4.2 Operational Situation, October 23, 1912

Map 4.3 Lüleburgaz to Pinarhisar, Planned Operations, October 29, 1912

105

Map 4.4 Lüleburgaz to Pinarhisar, Operational Situation, October 29, 1912

108

Map 4.5 Lüleburgaz to Pinarhisar, Planned Operations, October 30, 1912

112

Map 4.6 Lüleburgaz to Pinarhisar, Operational Situation, October 31, 1912

119

Map 4.7 The Çatalca Position, 1912

123

Map 4.8 The Çatalca Lines, November 10, 1912

126

Map 4.9 The First Battle of Çatalca, November 17, 1912

134

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Map 4.10 Adrianople Fortifications, 1912

140

Map 4.11 Kircaali Detachment—Operational Area, October 21, 1912

148

Map 4.12 Kircaali Detachment—Tactical Situation, November 16, 1912

152

Map 4.13 Kircaali Detachment—Tactical Situation, November 28, 1912

154

Map 4.14 Çanakkale Fortified Zone, Gallipoli, December 1912

158

Map 5.1 Western Army Concentration Areas, October 19, 1912

164

Map 5.2 Vardar Army Operational Plan, Based on Orders Issued October 24, 1912

177

Map 5.3 The Battle of Kumanova, October 24, 1912

179

Map 5.4 Vardar Army Operational Plan, Based on Orders Issued November 15–16, 1912

192

Map 5.5 Western Army Situation, November 28, 1912

206

Map 6.1 The Epiran and Montenegrin Fronts

213

Map 6.2 Battle of Venice, November 2, 1912

222

Map 8.1 Sarköy Operations Plan, February 8, 1913

255

Map 8.2 Sarköy Invasion, February 8, 1913

266

Map 8.3 Sarköy Invasion, February 10, 1913

269

Map 9.1 The Yanya Fortress, December 1912

294

Map 9.2 The Third Battle of Yanya, March 5–6, 1913

302

Map 10.1 The Advance to Adrianople, July 12–22, 1913

326

TABLES

Table 1.1 Disposition of Ottoman Forces, 1877

Table 1.2 Nonoperational Assignments, Ottoman Army, 1908

Table 1.3 Disposition of Ottoman Forces, 1908

Table 1.4 Organization of Ottoman Reserve (Redif) Infantry Divisions, 1908

Table 1.5 Ottoman Ministers of War, 1908–1914

Table 1.6 Ottoman Forces Participating in the October 1910 Maneuvers

Table 2.1 Population in the Ottoman Balkan Vilayets, 1908

Table 3.1 Ottoman Army Strength, 1912

Table 3.2 Disposition of Ottoman Forces, 1912

Table 3.3 Ottoman General Staff Functions, 1911

Table 3.4 Distribution of Ottoman Army Machine-Gun Detachments, 1912

Table 3.5 Ottoman Campaign Plans, 1912

Table 3.6 Estimated Balkan Coalition Forces, Campaign Plan Number 5

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Table 4.1 Operational Plans, 1912—Projected Ottoman Order of Battle for Thrace 79

Table 4.2 Actual Ottoman Order of Battle for Thrace, October 17, 1912 83

Table 4.3 Eastern Army Operations Order (Summary), October 21, 1912 86

Table 4.4 Adrianople Fortress Operations Order (Summary), October 22, 1912 92

Table 4.5 Ottoman Order of Battle, First and Second Eastern Armies, October 29, 1912 103

Table 4.6 Ottoman Order of Battle, Çatalca Army, November 17, 1912 128

Table 4.7 Comparison of Forces at Çatalca, November 17, 1912 131

Table 4.8 Çatalca Army Artillery Area Commands, November 17, 1912 132

Table 4.9 Artillery Strength, Adrianople Fortified Area, October 1, 1912 141

Table 4.10 Terms of the Adrianople Armistice, December 5, 1912 146

Table 5.1 Operational Plans, 1912—Projected Ottoman Order of Battle for the Balkans 166

Table 5.2 V Corps Strength, October 9, 1912 168

Table 5.3 Western Army Order of Battle, October 19, 1912 170

Table 5.4 Vardar Army Operations Order Number 9, Dated October 23, 1912 (Summary) 174

Table 5.5 Vardar Army Operations Order Number 10, Dated October 24, 1912 (Summary) 176

Table 5.6 Vardar Army Order of Battle, November 12, 1912 188

Table 5.7 Vardar Army Deployment, November 16, 1912 191

Table 5.8 Vardar Army Effective Strength, November 19, 1912 195

Table 6.1 Force Comparisons, Greek Front, October 19, 1912 216

Table 6.2 Surrender Protocol, Salonika and Ottoman Forces in the Area, November 8, 1912 (Summary) 225

Table 8.1 Çatalca Army Strength, February 1, 1913

252

Table 8.2 Special Operations Order, Provisional Force Command, February 7, 1913 (Summary)

257

Table 8.3 Loading Directive, Provisional X Corps, January 7, 1913

260

Table 8.4 Provisional X Corps, Embarked Strength

263

Table 8.5 Gallipoli General Forces Command, February 20, 1913

284

Table 8.6 Ottoman Order of Battle, Çatalca Army, March 25, 1913

287

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Table 9.1 Independent Yanya Corps Operations Order Number 19, December 20, 1912 (Summary) 297

Table 9.2 Independent Yanya Corps Strength, December 23, 1912 298

Table 9.3 Vardar Army Strength, March 23, 1913 314

Table 10.1 Vardar Army Formations Evacuated from the Balkans, June 4–13, 1913 319

Table 10.2 Işkodra Corps Formations Evacuated from the Balkans, June 7–13, 1913 320

Table 10.3 Vardar Army Strength, June 1913 321

Table 10.4 Ottoman Order of Battle, July 12, 1913 324

Table 10.5 Casualties in the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913 329

Table 10.6 Ottoman Corps and Divisions Destroyed, Captured or Inactivated during the First Balkan War 329

Table 11.1 Disposition of Ottoman Forces, July 1913

339

Table 11.2 Disposition of Ottoman Forces, August 3, 1914

343

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Foreword

“The Sick Man of Europe”: in the nineteenth century, everyone who made any pretense of keeping up with

current affairs knew the phrase meant the Ottoman Empire. Hammered from inside by dissident nationalities

wishing to break off in independent states, besieged from outside by ambitious imperial powers, the Ottomans

seemed little more than victims who, in turn, bullied the weak and helpless within their own frontiers. This

image, stemming as it did largely from diplomatic relationships, slid naturally into a portrayal of Ottoman

military efforts, which were seen by all casual observers as antiquated and corrupt. When, and if, the Turks

managed a military success of sorts, it was attributed to their European allies (if they had any), as, for

example in the Crimean War, or the stupidity of their enemies, as in Osman Pasa’s defense of the lines of

Plevna in the Russo-Turkish clash of the 1870s.

Much the same sort of interpretation has colored Turkish military history in the early twentieth century. If

Ottoman forces managed to push the British off the Gallipoli Peninsula, this was due to the inept command of

British generals; when they captured an entire British expeditionary force at Kut-al-Amara in Iraq, this was

due to the negli-gence of General Townshend, who managed to pen himself into a cul-de-sac. If General

Allenby took a surprisingly long time—indeed, the entire final two years of World War I—to push the Turks

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out of Palestine and back to Damascus, it was because the Turks had German advice and the British had

incredible logistical difficulties. When, after the Great War, the Turks won some military respect for driving the

Greeks into the sea at Izmir, the explanation was seen to be a national reaction against a foreign invader,

combined with the inspired leader-

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ship of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk): real enough factors, but perhaps more was involved.

Such a litany alone should give pause for reflection, and even, perhaps, the idea that the Turks, for all their

problems of holding the empire together through the mechanisms of unwieldy government and economic

structure, had, in fact, not done too badly in military terms. Historians and students alike would do well to

remember that in World War I, the Ottoman Empire, though fighting in Gallipoli, Pales-tine/Syria, Iraq, and

the Caucasus, lasted as long as both the Hapsburg and Hohenzollern Empires and considerably longer than

that of the Romanovs.

Only in recent years have historians begun to correct the record, and Ed Erickson is in the forefront of this

development. His book on the Ottoman Army in World War I, Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army

in the First World War, is without question, a major contribution in that respect, as is this new study on the

Balkan Wars. Through his familiarity with the Turkish language and the access he has obtained to Turkish

records, most notably modern Turkish Army studies of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century

campaigns, he has opened up an important window through which we are beginning to understand just how

the Turks responded to their own military situation and did their best to incorporate the most important

contemporary military innovations in weaponry and tactics at any particular time. Lieutenant Colonel Erickson

(U.S. Army, retired), knows from his own extensive experience how military machines operate; his own

familiarity with the Turkish and Balkan landscapes from his service in the area unquestionably contributes to

the value of his research.

I first met Ed Erickson when, a good many years ago, he came as an undergraduate to Colgate University;

here he and I and a handful of other students very definitely ran counter to contemporary trends in our study

of military history through the ages—a pursuit, indeed an avocation, that Ed has carried with him throughout

his career. Like any professor who is proud of a former student, I would be delighted to take full credit for his

ensuing career as a professional historian, but it would hardly be just: after all, he came to Colgate already a

dedicated “ama-teur” in the true sense of the word; that is, he studies military history for the love of it.

Lieutenant Colonel Erickson’s work overall and, indeed, its reader-ship prove an important point. In the last

several decades, the historical profession has experienced revolutionary developments in the area of gender,

ethnic, and working-class studies, which have exploded the limits of traditional politically focused history. All

that is to the benefit of the field; unfortunately, military history has, in the process, been lumped together,

and marginalized, with political and diplomatic stud-

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ies, as antiquated and tradition bound. But one need only explore the pages of the International History

Review or the Journal of Military History or sense the excitement of some of the sessions of the Society of

Military History’s annual meetings to realize that a similar revolution is underway in the military field as well.

Most notable in this respect is the growing number of studies that treat non-Western military history from the

viewpoint of the indigenous participants, and not merely from that of outside, Western observers whose

reflections have been passed on by generations of scholars as the accepted canon. In that sense, Ed and

other military historians who go at their subjects from within are just as much revolutionary revisionists as

those who are working in other, more visible fields. It must never be forgotten that those awkward wars were

of massive importance to the lives of the inhabitants of the nations that were affected, whatever their class,

gender, or ethnicity. Military life cannot really be disassociated from civilian life: after all, if the Turks really

were making important strides in modernization of their military methods, perhaps that reflected a society

that was in transition to the modern era, and not simply the supine, decaying “Sick Man” so often portrayed.

The evidence for the Ottoman Empire is increasingly strong from the era of World War I; as Colonel Erickson

now demonstrates, important antecedents must also be sought in the massive, but little known, Balkan Wars

of 1912–1913.

Briton C.Busch

William R.Kenan Jr. Professor of History

Colgate University

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