Bismarck - Ferro Ignique.pdf - Strategia - materiały po ang - kyclawok

Bismar ck a nd t he E uro pea n Allianc e Sys te m:

Ferro Ignique (By Fire and Iro n)

From the beginning of his political involvement in 1847, to his appointment as Imperial

Chancellor in 1871, until his dismissal by Kaiser William II in 1890, Otto von Bismarck embodied

the epitome of European statesmanship that enlarged the Prussian monarchy through skillful

diplomacy and limited w ar. T he ability to r ecog nize and blend t he relat ionship bet ween po licy and

str at egy r esu lte d in t he un ificat ion o f var iou s smalle r so ver eigns , an d t he cr eat ion o f a sing le

Ger man s ta te und er t he a usp ices of t he P ru ssia n mon arc hy.

According to Carl von Clausewitz, limited war can take on two forms: offensive war with

a limited aim and defensive war. 1 Both are applicable in relation to Bismarckÿs career that saw an

app licat ion o f the for mer u p t o 1 871 , an d t he lat te r du ring his pe rio d o f co nso lidat ion. In his

book, On War , Clause witz po ints ou t t hat o ffensive war wit h a limited aim culminates in t he

oc cup at ion o f enemy t err ito ry t hat will re duc e his n at iona l res ou rce s. F urt her mor e, o nce t his

means to an end is accomplished, an asset is thus made available at the negotiating table for

trading or bargaining. 2 In distinguishing between ÿunlimitedÿÿ and ÿlimitedÿÿ war, it will suffice to

refe r ba ck t o Cla use wit z who sta te s th at abso lut e (u nlimite d) w ar is the mobiliz at ion o f all

resources. The opposite (limited war) embodies the limited mobilization of limited resources.

Clausewitz goes on to explain that limited war is dictated by political motives. More simply put,

war is a c ont inua tio n of po licy. 3 As we shall see, Bismarckÿs political goals never over-extended

beyond Prussian rule over a greater Germany. While exhibiting a reckless ambition in the confines

of his own designs for Prussia, he never became over zealous or attempted to pursue political

objectives that were beyond Prussiaÿs capabilities. Historically, Bismarck stands more apart from

any othe r Eur opea n stat esman or military dictat or fo r the simple reaso n that he never lo st wha t he

had gained.

Bismar ckÿs po litica l go al t o e xpan d Pr uss ian r ule o ver Ger man t err ito ries tha t r esu lte d in

the limited wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870, was a meticulously planned calculation of diplomacy

tha t w as fo llow ed b y limite d milit ary a ct ion. His p olit ical g eniu s t hat was cha rac te riz ed b y

tremendous vision operated to such an extent that only limited military action was necessary for

the final coup dé grace . In fulfilling his political objectives, to further the influence, rule, and

Carl von Clausewitz, On War , ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Par et, (Princeton, N J,

Princeton University Press, Princeton Original Paperback, 1989) , p. 602.

2 Clausewitz, On War , 611-12. Also consulted was B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy , 2d rev. ed., (New York, Penguin

Group, 199 1), p. 320 and 340, refers to the sa me concept as li mitati on of aim. Wh ile his r easons for pur suing such

an aim have a par aphr ased rin g to Clausewitz , he fails t o make a preci se connection between the polit ical policy

and limited aims. Furth ermore, Hart fails to grasp the real value of Clausewitz that nails warfare onto policy, but

rather emphasizes the psychological factors as his greatest contribution to the theory of war.

3 Clausewitz, On War , 20- 22; 64 2. Th e mobili zati on of al l avai lable r esourc es can be compa red t o the ex ampl e of

the Fren ch Revolution, wh ere Napoleon Bona parte h arnessed t he leveÿÿ en mass and alm ost conquered E urope.

sphere of the Prussian monarchy, he knew exactly how, when, and where to defeat his enemy.

This formula was a true rendition of Clausewitzÿs ÿtrinityÿÿ of war that considered government,

military, and the people. 4 Bismarck averted general war by isolating his enemy through

diplomacy, c ontr olling his military count erpar ts in delivering d ecisive victo ries, and by appealing

to the public for domestic support. As will we shall see, his hardened skill in knowing when to

make and break alliances, sue for peace, and resist articulating his political views to the military,

allowed B ismarck t o aver t gene ral war , and t hrou gh vario us tr eaties he was lat er able t o ret ain the

spoils of war. 5

Without me three wars would not have happened and 80,000 men would not have perished.

-Bismarck

The War of 1864, waged by the Austro-Prussian alliance against Denmark for the Duchies

of Sleswig and Holstein, was fought to force the Danish government to revalidate the Treaty of

1852 that go verned Denmarkÿs relationship with the Duchies. 6 Bismarckÿs goal, in the end, was

to persuade the Prussian Kaiser to demand the Duchies by right of conquest, and in the case that

Austria refused to consent, Bismarck would accomplish his goal through a force of arms.

Aiding in his p lan wa s th e po stu lat ed d ivisio n of t he o the r gr eat er p ow ers , t hat he kn ew w ou ld

make it impossible to return to the Treaty of 1852. Everything worked out just as Bismarck had

planned, and after armed intervention against the Danes had succeeded, the two Duchies were

under the control of Austria and Prussia. The two German powers, however, could not agree on

the disp osit ion o f the newly a cqu ired te rr ito ry. A t t he co nclus ion o f the Con vent ion o f Gas te in in

1865, the t wo Du chies wer e tempo rarily divided as H olste in fell under co ntro l of Austr ia and

Sles wig by w ay of P rus sia. In a mast erfu l plo y to the Pru ssian King, Bismar ck c onv inced the him

that Austr ia had self-ag grandizing int entions whose aim it was, a mong ot her t hings, t o dep rive

Prussia of its rightful aspirations.

In the war against Denmark, Bismarck applied the first element in the trinity of war

thro ugh diplo macy to iso late De nmark. H e acco mplishes this by making Denmar k look as the

aggre ssor , afte r refus ing to reco gnize the rights o f the Duc hies of 185 2. Ano ther aspect in the

isola tio n of D enmar k wa s to str engt hen t he t ies be tw een P rus sia a nd t hos e co unt ries tha t c ou ld

Clausewitz, On War , 89.

5 Consulted was Paul Kennedy, ed. Grand Strategies in War and Peace , (New York, 1991), p. 5, and Gordon A.

Craig, The Politics of the Prussia Army 1640-1945 , (New York, 1955), p. 167. After a meeting with the King in

1862, when Bismarck gave him an abbreviated plan that, among other things, excluded Austria from Germany, the

King r eacted comp letely adver se to such a n idea and Bis marck was forbidden to pursu e a ant i-Aust rian policy. By

keeping information that had such vast scope about his real intentions to himself, he was able to play one diplomat,

military general, or Kaiser against th e other for the purpose of gaining the upper ha nd.

6 The Treaty and Protocol of London in 1852 prescribed that Prince Christian of Glÿcksburg was the heir to the

Danish Crown that in coperated the two Dutchies. This treaty was signed by Austria and Prussia. See Erich Eyck,

Bismarck and the Ge rman Empire , (New York, 1958), p. 79-80.

become potential adversaries as allies of Denmark. The secret Alvensleben Convention of 1863

gained Russian support during the Polish uprising. At the same time however, Bismarck rejected

cer ta in t rea tie s fr om F ran ce a nd R uss ia t hat may ha ve r est ric te d his flexib ility. 7

The second element in the trinity of war for Bismarck was controlling the military to

limited and decisive actions. With the possibility of a protracted war if the Danish Army decided

to a void bat tle and fall back to t he fort ified positio n at Dÿppel, t he military factio n, unde r the

leaders hip of Gener al Feldmarshal Co unt He lmuth von Mo ltke, planned t o bypass D ÿppel and

seize all of Jut land to force capitu lation. During t he act ual advanc e into t he Duchies, the

anticipated became reality, and rather than launch a frontal assault against Dÿppel, the military

followed the plans for Jutland. Bismarck, who recognized the danger of losing Austria as a

coalition partner by occupying Jutland, threatened with his resignation if storming Dÿppel for a

decisive victory was not carried out. 8 This tac tic suc ceede d and Bismar ck pre vailed with t he

added alignment for the third element in the trinity of war that concerned the people.

Once t he Pru ssian forc es over ran t he pos itions, popu lar sent iments wer e natio nalistic and

higher than ever before. This patriotic feeling also affected Bismarckÿs political opposition that,

for the moment, jettisoned their constitutional principles for the glory of Prussian military

dex te rit y. 9 As an extension of the War of 1864, the matter was finally settled through a clash of

arms in th e War of 1 866 , wit h th e re sult tha t bo th D uchie s ca me und er P rus sian c ont ro l. 10

The War of 1866 was nothing more than a continuation of the former conflict that aro se

betwe en Aust ria and P russia aft er t he defeat of the Danes in t he War o f 1864. Austr ia wante d the

complete separation of Sleswig and Holstein from Denmark and to be formed as a single state

under the rule of Prince of Augustenburg. Bismarck considered Augustenburg a liberal and, more

importantly, a threat to Pr ussian interests. 11 Tensions peaked when Bismarck ordered Prussian

Eyck, Bismark , 68-73.

Consulted was Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussia Army 1640-1945 , (New York, 1955), pp. 182-185 .

Ibid., 190.

Craig, Politics of the Prussia Army , pp. 168-170, and Eyck, Bismarck , 106.

11 Eyck, Bismarck , 95- 98. Di fferen ces between Austr ia an d Pru ssia wer e compl ex. Th e Germ an C onfeder ation

tha t reem erged as a pr oduct of t he re voluti on, of wh ich t he Ger man Diet wa s the g overn ing body, was le ad by

Austria . While th e Confederati onÿs greater powers were made up of Austr ia and Prussia, the Fra nkfurter

parliament proclaimed Prussia as the leader of future Germany in 1850. He became utterly opposed to Austria and

his policy becomes clear d uring the politi cal aspects of the C rimean War of 1854-56 . Durin g this ti me, Bismar ck

set about to disrupt all the efforts of Austria, while at the same time concluding a treaty with them. Part of the

Austrian policy was the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Danube, but Bismarck did every thing possible to

embarrass Austria and their political leaders, such as the envoy Prokesch-Osten. While Bismarck proclaimed no

int erest in t he re gion of a poten tial stra tegic i ndus tri al bas e, Pr okesch corre ctly acces sed Bism arck ÿs ulte rior

motives as ÿthe most energetic but by no means the only representative of that Prussian policy whose aim it is to

rob Aus tri a of all her s uccess for her e norm ous effort s, to r uin her fi nan ces an d her prest ige, a nd to a cquir e for

Prussia t he de facto , and soon t he de jure , hegemony over Germany.ÿÿ

troops into Holstein. The Austrians replied with full mobilization, and shortly after thereafter on

15 June 1866, Austria received a Prussian ultimatum for unconditional acceptance of the Prussian

plan for reform and the demobilization of troops. 12 Not having rece ived an answe r to the

ultimatum by midnight of that same day, Prussian troops attacked and won a decisive victory

thr ee w eek s lat er a t Kÿniggr ÿtz . T he pe ace co nclud ed a t P rag ue in A ugu st 1 866 saw Pru ssia g ain

overall control of Germany and excluded Austria altogether. Prussia contro lled all those

territories north of the River Main, which included Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and the Free

City of Fra nkfurt . Tho se are as sou th of t he river t hat include d Bavar ia, Wurt emberg, and Bad en,

were all bound to Schutz - und Trutzbÿndniÿe (alliances) which Bismarck forced them to accept

wit h th rea ts of a nnex at ion t o P ru ssia if th ey did not co mply. 13 These measures were designed to

safeguard Prussia against the next opponent, France.

In e xamining the war aga inst Aust ria t hro ugh the lens o f the tr inity, Bismar ck hims elf

stated every element to the French Embassador, Count Vincent Benedetti,

I have induced a King of Prussia to break off the intimate relations of his House with the

House of the Hapsburg, to conclude an alliance with revolutionary Italy, possibly accept

arrangements with Imperial France, and to propose in Frankfurt the reform of the

Confederation and a popular parliament. 14

Bismarck isolated Austria through skillful diplomacy. The sheer fact that Austria declared war on

Pru ssia v alida te d t he no tio n th at Aust ria w as t he ag gre sso r, even tho ugh the y act ed in s elf

defe nse. Mor e sk illful dip lomac y tha t iso lat ed Au str ia ca me by co nclud ing a t rea ty w ith I ta ly

under F rench su ccor that dest royed t he alliance of t he Confed erat ion. 15 Controlling the military to

limited action during the war of 1866 was crucial after the battle of Kÿniggrÿtz.

12 Eyck, Bismarck , 127. Additionally, see Hajo Holborn, The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the

General Staff, in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to thje Nuclear Age , (Princeton,

NJ, 1986), p. 292-93. The Prussi an war a gainst Austria was decided by one importa nt factor oth er than the new

needle gun . The Austr ians were sim ply of antiquit y. Even though their officers and men were better tra ined

th an th e Pr uss ia ns , t he y wer e st il l us in g st ra teg ies an d ta cti cs of th e 18 th Cen tu ry.

13 Ibid., 133-36.

Ibid., 115.

For information regarding the Treaty with Italy see Eyck, Bismarck , 112-15. All general matters

concerning the declaration of war are found between 123-25. Also consulted was Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy ,

(New York, 1994), p. 108, who discusses the effects of the Crimean War, as it relates to the isolation of Austria,

where it is resolved during the European Congress that Russia is no longer regarded as the Protector of the

Ottoman Christian s. Another example of his diplomatic ability was displayed in 1862, when Napoleon III

concluded a commercial trade treaty with Prussia. Prussia, as the leading member of the German Zollverein ,

effectively breached the Central-European Customs Union, concluded with Austria. Here, Bismarckÿs intentions

were to maintain good relations with Napoleon III.

The total destruction and occupation of Austria was not a necessity. The limits of the war

are easily recognized by the fact that Prussian victory was primarily based on the Battle of

Kÿniggrÿtz alone. Again, more decisive fighting, in this case dealing with the plans of Moltke to

march on V ienna, was n ot a nec essit y, but alto get her o ut o f the que stio n. T he po ssibility o f a

French attack into Germany while the Prussians were operating in Bohemia was a great concern

that Bismarck could not ignore. 16 Equally so, Prussian rule over Austria by way of annexation

(occupation) was simply not an option for Bismarck. To do so would mean more a strain than

gain. Bismarc kÿs pro found vision is fur ther validated by the value he places o n reest ablishing

rela tio ns wit h th e Ha psbu rg M ona rch y. Bis marc kÿs tr uly ÿlimited war ÿÿ is dist inguis hed b y his

comment t o a military ad visor o f the Cr own Pr ince, ÿÿWe shall need Aus triaÿs str ength in t he

future for ourselves.ÿÿ Bismarck was not resolute on waging total war against Austria. In a letter

to his wife, Bismarck wrote,

If we do not exaggerate our demands and do not believe that we have conquered the

wor ld, w e shall g et a peac e wo rt h the effor ts w e have made. But we- tha t mea ns, o f

course, the King- are easily intoxicated as we are depressed, and I have the thankless task

of po uring wat er into his wine and bringing ho me the t rut h that we do not live alo ne in

Europe but with three neighbours (sic). 17

Eric h Eyck , au tho r o f Bismarck and the German Emp ire , wro te ÿthese are t he tho ughts and the

words of a real statesman.ÿ 18 Henr y Kissinge r, a uth or of Diplomacy wro te, ÿThe st ates man who

extolled Realpolitik possessed an extraordinary sense of proportion which turned power into an

instrument of self-restraint.ÿ 19 Real sta tesmanship is g ained by the a bility to manipulat e the

general public and political opponents. Capitalizing on the nationalistic frenzy that gripped

Prussia, Bismarck reinforced his popular support by calling for a new election for a German

parliament through universal suffrage. 20 Success in implementing the trinity of war helped

Bismarck avert general war with Austria and expose his next opponent, Imperial France.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was the third and last war that Bismarck was

16 Craig, Politics of the Prussian Army , 196-201, and Kennedy, Grand Strategies , 32. Kennedy gives a

rather misleading analogy of the strategy of destruction as it would pertain to Bismarck. He argues that Prussia

defeate d the arm ies of Aus tri a outr igh t after the p eace ter ms whi ch was n ot th e case. T he pl ans t o mar ch on

Vienna were, after all, never implemented.

Eyck, Bismarck , 132.

Ibid., 133.

Kissinger, Diplomacy , 121.

Eyck, Bismarck , 115-17. Bismarck knew that the issue surrounding universal suffrage was a wild card,

even though he was against it by heart. Unfortunately, it really did not produce the effect that he hoped it would.

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