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PROBLEMS OF VISION
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PROBLEMS
OF VISION
Rethinking the
Causal Theory
of Perception
GERALD VISION
New York Oxford
Oxford University Press
1997
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Oxford University Press
Oxford New York
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Copyright © 1997 by Oxford University Press, Inc.
Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.
198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016
Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
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without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Vision, Gerald.
Problems of vision : rethinking the causal theory of
perception / Gerald Vision.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-19-510498-6
1. Perception. 2. Sense (Philosophy) 3. Visual perception.
4. Senses and sensation. I. Title.
BD214.V57 1996
131'.3—dc20
96-23100
135798642
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
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PREFACE
By the time I originally set out to tie up loose ends in the causal theory of percep-
tion (in a tidy monograph!), the view already suffered from a badly split personal-
ity. From its seventeenth century renewal till well into this century, the causal
theory has been a codicil to sense-datum philosophy, citing causes in the physical
environment to explain how the purely subjective contents of our experience could
be regarded by us as providing information about that environment. In that role it
has been an embattled view, coming under a barrage of epistemological and se-
mantic objections. The causes that it cites remain forever beyond the compass of
any humanly possible experience. Later, shortly after midcentury, just as sense-
datum philosophy was undergoing a steady and seemingly permanent decline,
causalism was defended on grounds independent of its former function. Thus,
paradoxically, causalism was enjoying something of a minirevival while the phi-
losophy of perception to which its fate had been heretofore linked was becoming
a quaint historical relic. (Of course, a few devoted, talented sense-datum theorists
are still around. Philosophy seldom totally obliterates old and unfashionable
views. But the merits of the case aside, this accurately summarizes recent trends
in philosophy.)
This state of affairs has fostered some confusion, and in my naive enthusiasm
for the subject I had failed to realize what labrythine paths it would take me down.
More than a few philosophers are bewildered about where a causal theory fits: "If
it is not an emergency exit from sense-datum philosophy and that view's dreadful
consequences, of what use is it?" The somewhat cryptic answer, which I develop
further later, is that it explains how sensory evidence is a product of what it is
evidence for. Meanwhile, certain critics, unable to detach causalism from its clas-
sical associations, are astounded that recent thinkers continue to rely on it. "Hasn't
this new breed of causalists heard about the devastating objections both to subjec-
tive contents and to appealing to a forever-beyond-our-grasp reality to rescue our
chestnuts from the fire?" Up to the time of this writing, objections to the causal
theory from some usually reliable quarters begin with a familiar warning that
normal perceptual experience doesn't involve purely subjective contents.
One reason for reopening this issue is to set the record straight on this score.
In that respect, this book is a hopeful monster; the sort of mutation that selec-
tionists give some better than usual, but still slight, chance for taking root in the
evolutionary soil. I cannot claim it is a reason I had for undertaking the project in
the first place. For, as I mentioned, until I intensified my search for sources, both
pro and con, I failed to realize just how deeply entrenched was the confusion
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